Using Depth for Pixel-Wise Detection of Adversarial Attacks in Crowd
  Counting by Liu, Weizhe et al.
Using Depth for Pixel-Wise Detection of Adversarial Attacks in Crowd Counting
Weizhe Liu Mathieu Salzmann Pascal Fua
Computer Vision Laboratory, E´cole Polytechnique Fe´de´rale de Lausanne (EPFL)
{weizhe.liu, mathieu.salzmann, pascal.fua}@epfl.ch
Abstract
State-of-the-art methods for counting people in crowded
scenes rely on deep networks to estimate crowd density.
While effective, deep learning approaches are vulnerable
to adversarial attacks, which, in a crowd-counting context,
can lead to serious security issues. However, attack and
defense mechanisms have been virtually unexplored in re-
gression tasks, let alone for crowd density estimation.
In this paper, we investigate the effectiveness of exist-
ing attack strategies on crowd-counting networks, and in-
troduce a simple yet effective pixel-wise detection mecha-
nism. It builds on the intuition that, when attacking a mul-
titask network, in our case estimating crowd density and
scene depth, both outputs will be perturbed, and thus the
second one can be used for detection purposes. We will
demonstrate that this significantly outperforms heuristic-
based and uncertainty-based strategies.
1. Introduction
State-of-the-art crowd counting algorithms [69, 71, 44,
49, 63, 54, 50, 38, 27, 48, 53, 34, 20, 47, 4] rely on Deep
Networks to regress a crowd density, which is then inte-
grated to estimate the number of people in the image. Their
application can have important societal consequences, for
example when they are used to assess how many people at-
tended a demonstration or a political event.
In the “Fake News” era, it is therefore to be feared that
hackers might launch adversarial attacks to bias the output
of these models for political gain. While such attacks have
been well studied for classification networks [15, 23, 41, 43,
42, 6], they remain largely unexplored territory for people
counting and even for regression at large. The only related
approach we know of [46] is very recent and specific to at-
tacking optical flow networks, leaving the pixel-wise detec-
tion of attacks untouched.
In this paper, our goal is to blaze a trail in that direction.
Our main insight is that if a two-stream network is trained
to regress both the people density and the scene depth, it be-
comes very difficult to affect one without affecting the other.
Figure 1: Density and Depth (DaD) model. A two-stream net-
work is trained to regress both the people density and the scene
depth. The pixels that have been attacked to alter the density esti-
mate will also produce incorrect depths and can thus be detected.
In other words, pixels that have been modified to alter the
density estimate will also produce incorrect depths, which
can be detected by estimating depth by unrelated means.
When a ground-truth depth-map can be kept safe from the
attacker, this is easily done. When this is not an option,
we will show that using statistics from depth-maps acquired
earlier suffices to detect tampering at a later date.
Fig. 1 depicts our approach. We will show that it is ro-
bust to both black-box attacks, in which the adversary does
not know the existence of adversarial detector, and white-
box attacks, in which the adversary can access not only the
density regression network but also our adversarial detec-
tor. In other words, even when our approach is exposed,
a hacker cannot mount an effective attack while avoiding
detection. This is because in surveillance videos recorded
by a fixed camera, untampered depth map pixels tend to
change less over time than RGB image pixels. In a crowded
scene, depth measurements are affected by the appearance
and disappearance of people but the perturbations remain
small whereas those of RBG pixels can be much larger due
to illumination and appearance changes. Therefore, even if
the attacker has access to the depth maps, it remains diffi-
cult to guarantee that they will be altered in a consistent and
undetectable way. We will refer to this as the Density and
Depth (DaD) model.
Our contribution therefore is an effective approach to
foiling adversarial attacks on people counting algorithms
that rely on deep learning. Its principle is very generic and
could be naturally extended to other image regression tasks.
Our experiments on several benchmark datasets demon-
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strate that it outperforms heuristic-based and uncertainty-
based attack detection strategies.
2. Related Work
Crowd Counting. Early crowd counting methods [61, 60,
29] tended to rely on counting-by-detection, that is, explic-
itly detecting individual heads or bodies and then counting
them. Unfortunately, in very crowded scenes, occlusions
make detection difficult, and these approaches have been
largely displaced by counting-by-density-estimation ones.
They rely on training a regressor to estimate people den-
sity in various parts of the image and then integrating. This
trend began in [8, 25, 12], using either Gaussian Process or
Random Forests regressors. Even though approaches rely-
ing on low-level features [9, 7, 3, 45, 8, 19] can yield good
results, they have now mostly been superseded by CNN-
based methods [69, 63, 34, 54, 65, 44, 50, 71, 49, 4, 59, 35,
39, 51, 37, 36, 21, 72, 70, 58, 28, 31, 66, 40, 33, 64, 65, 52,
55, 10, 57, 67, 68], a survey of which can be found in [54].
In this paper, we therefore focus on attacks against these.
Defense against Adversarial Attacks. Deep networks
trained to solve classification problems are vulnerable to
adversarial attacks [15, 23, 41, 43, 42, 6]. Existing at-
tack strategies can be roughly split in two categories,
optimization-based and gradient-based. The former [43, 42,
6] involve terms related to the class probabilities, which
makes the latter [15, 23, 41] better candidates for attacks
against deep regression models. The very recent work
of [46] is the only one we know of that examines adversarial
attacks for a regression task, that is, optical flow estimation.
However, it does not propose defense mechanisms, which
by contrast is the focus of this paper.
In the context of classification, one popular defense is
adversarial training [56], which augments the training data
with adversarial examples and has been shown to outper-
form many competing methods [16, 14, 18, 1, 26, 11]. How-
ever, it needs access to adversarial examples, which are of-
ten not available ahead of time and expensive to generate
during training. As a consequence, several alternative ap-
proaches have been proposed. This includes training aux-
iliary classifiers, ranging from simple linear regressors to
complex neural networks, to predict whether a sample is ad-
versarial or not. However, as shown in [5], such detection
mechanisms can easily be defeated by an adversary target-
ing them directly.
In any event, none of these methods are designed to de-
tect attacks at the pixel-level. Even the few researchers
who have studied adversarial attacks for semantic segmen-
tation [62, 30], which is a pixel-level prediction task, do not
go beyond detection at the global image level.
A seemingly natural approach to performing pixel-level
attack detection would be to rely on prediction uncertainty.
layer encoder layer decoder
1 - 2 3×3×64 conv-1 1 3×3×512 conv-2
2 × 2 max pooling 2 3×3×512 conv-2
3 - 4 3×3×128 conv-1 3 3×3×512 conv-2
2 × 2 max pooling 4 3×3×256 conv-2
5 - 7 3×3×256 conv-1 5 3×3×128 conv-2
2 × 2 max pooling 6 3×3×64 conv-2
8 - 10 3×3×512 conv-1 7 1×1×1 conv-1
11 context-aware features [37]
Table 1: Layers of the encoder and of the decoder. All lay-
ers are convolutional and described in terms of “(kernel size) ×
(kernel size)× (number of filters) conv-(dilation rate)”, except for
layer 11 of the encoder that produces context-aware features [37]
using weighted multi-scale features generated by Spatial Pyramid
Pooling [17].
In [11], the authors argue that Bayesian uncertainty [13] is
a reliable way to detect the adversarial examples because
the perturbed pixels generally have much higher uncertainty
values. Uncertainty can be computed using dropout, as
in [13], learned from data [22], or estimated using the neg-
ative log-likelihood of each prediction [24]. In our experi-
ments, we will extend this strategy to pixel-wise adversarial
attack detection and show that our approach significantly
outperforms it.
3. Density and Depth Model
As discussed in Section 2, most state-of-the-art crowd
counting algorithms rely on a deep network regressor Fd,
that takes an image I as input and returns DestI = Fd(I,Θ),
an estimated density map, which should be as close as pos-
sible to a ground-truth one DgtI in L
2 norm terms. Here,
Θ stands for the network’s weights, which have been opti-
mized for this purpose.
An adversarial attack then involves generating a pertur-
bation P = Fp(I, DgtI ), where Fp maps the input im-
age and ground-truth densities to P in such a way that
A = I+P is visually indistinguishable from I while yield-
ing a crowd density estimate Fd(A,Θ) that is as different
as possible from the ground-truth one.
We will review the best known ways to generate such
attacks in Section 4.1. Here, our concern is to define Fd so
as to defeat them by ensuring that they are easily detected.
To this end, we leverage an auxiliary task, depth estimation,
as follows.
Network Architecture. Instead of training a single re-
gressor that predicts only people density, we train a two-
stream network where one stream predicts people density
Figure 2: Density and Depth model. An input RGB image is first encoded to deep features by an encoder network. Then, these features
are decoded to a crowd density map and a depth map by two different decoder networks. At inference time, we detect adversarial attacks
in a pixel-wise manner by observing the depth estimation errors.
and the other depth at each pixel. We write
DestI = Fd(I,Θ) , (1)
ZestI = Fz(I,Θ) ,
where DestI and Z
est
I are the estimated densities and depths
while Fd and Fz are two regressors parameterized by the
weigths Θ. The network that implements Fd and Fz com-
prises a single encoder and two decoders, one that produces
the densities and the other the depths. It is depicted by
Fig. 2 and we provide details about its architecture in Ta-
ble 1. Note that some of the weights in Θ are specific to the
first decoder and others to the second.
As the two decoders use the same set of features as in-
put, it is difficult to tamper with the results of one without
affecting that of the other, as we will see in Section 4.4.
More specifically, if pixel j ∈ Ii is perturbed to change the
local density estimate, the local depth estimate is likely to
be affected as well. We therefore take the relative error in
depth estimation with respect to the ground-truth depth map
|Zest(j)− Zgt(j)|
Zgt(j)
(2)
to be an indicator of a potential disturbance. In practice,
we label a pixel as potentially tampered with if this dif-
ference is larger than the top 5% of this difference in the
training dataset, and we will evaluate the influence of this
hyper-parameter in Section 4.6. In test sequences for which
the ground-truth depth map can also be tampered with by
the attackers, we can use the statistics of the training depth
maps to also detect such tampering, as will be shown in
Section 4.5.
Network Training. Given a set of N training images
{Ii}1≤i≤N with corresponding ground-truth density maps
{Dgti }1≤i≤N and ground-truth depth maps {Zgti }1≤i≤N ,
we learn the weights Θ of the two regressors by minimizing
the loss
L(Θ) =
1
2B
B∑
i=1
(‖Dgti −DestIi ‖22 + λ · ‖Zgti − ZestIi ‖22) , (3)
where B is the batch size and λ is a hyper-parameter that
balances the contributions of the two losses. We found em-
pirically that λ = 0.01 yields the best overall performance,
as will be shown in section 4.4.
To obtain the ground-truth density maps Dgti , we rely on
the same strategy as previous work [27, 49, 71, 48, 32]. In
each training image Ii, we annotate a set of ci 2D points
Ogti = {Oji }1≤j≤ci that denote the position of each human
head in the scene. The corresponding ground-truth density
map Dgti is obtained by convolving an image containing
ones at these locations and zeroes elsewhere with a Gaus-
sian kernel of mean µ and variance σ.
4. Experiments
In this section, we first introduce the existing adversar-
ial attack methods that can be used against a deep regres-
sor and describe the evaluation metric and the benchmark
datasets we used to assess their performance. We then use
them against our approach to demonstrate its robustness,
and conclude with an ablation study that demonstrates that
our approach is robust to the hyper-parameter setting and
works well when used in conjunction with several recent
crowd density regressors [71, 27, 37] .
4.1. Attacking a Deep Regressor
While there exist many adversarial attackers [15, 23,
41, 43, 42, 6], their effectiveness have been proven mostly
against classifiers but far more rarely against regres-
sors [46]. As discussed in Section 2, the gradient-based
methods [15, 23, 41] are the most suitable ones to at-
tack regressors and we focus on the so-called Fast Gradi-
ent Sign Methods (FSGMs), which are the most successful
and widely used ones. We will distinguish between black-
box attacks in which the attacker does not know that we
use depth for verification purposes and white-box attacks in
which they do.
Black-Box Attacks. If the attacker is unaware that we use
the depth map for verification purposes, they will only try
to affect the density map. They might then use one of the
following variants of FSGM.
Untargeted FSGM (FSGM-U(n)) [15, 23]. It gener-
ates adversarial examples designed to increase the network
loss as much as possible for the correct answer, thereby pre-
venting the networks from predicting it. Given an input im-
age I, the ground-truth densityDgt, and the regressor Fd of
Eq. 1 parametrized by Θ, the attack is performed by iterat-
ing
Iadv0 = I , (4)
Iadvi+1 = clip(I
adv
i + α · sign(∇IL(Fd(Iadvi ; Θ),Dgt)), ).
n times. The adversarial example is then taken to be Iadvn
and we will refer to this as FSGM-U(n). It is a single-step
or multiple-step attack without target and clip guarantees
that the resulting perturbation is bounded by . For consis-
tency with earlier work [15, 23], when n = 1, we reformu-
late this attack as
Iadv = I+  · sign(∇IL(Fd(I; Θ),Dgt)). (5)
Unless otherwise specified we use  = 15, α = 1, and
n = 19, as recommended in earlier work [23]. These num-
bers are chosen to substantially increase the crowd counting
error while keeping the perturbation almost imperceptible
to the human eye. We will analyze the sensitivity of our ap-
proach to these values in Section 4.6. An example of this
attack is shown in Fig. 3. By comparing Fig. 3(d) and (e),
we can see that the attack made some people “disappear”.
Targeted FSGM (FSGM-T(n)) [23]. Instead of sim-
ply preventing the network from finding the right answer
Dgt, we can target a specific wrong answer Dt. This is
achieved using the slightly modified iterative scheme
Iadv0 = I , (6)
Iadvi+1 = clip(I
adv
i − α · sign(∇IL(Fd(Iadvi ; Θ),Dt)), ).
Again, we take the adversarial example to be Iadvn and use
the same values as before for  and α. We will refer to this
as FSGM-T(n). In our experiments, we take the targets to
be the true value plus one, which creates an obvious error
while yielding tampered images that are undistinguishable
from the original ones.
White-Box Attacks. If the attacker knows that we are us-
ing the depth maps and has access to both Fd and Fz , the
two regressors of Eq. 1, their natural reaction will be to try
to modify the density maps while leaving the depth maps as
unchanged as possible. To this end, we propose the follow-
ing exposed variations of the untargeted and targeted FSGM
attacks described above.
Untargeted Exposed FSGM (FSGM-UE(n)). The it-
erative scheme becomes
Iadv0 = I , (7)
Lalli = L(Fd(Iadvi ; Θ),Dgt)− λ · L(Fz(Iadvi ; Θ), z) ,
Iadvi+1 = clip(I
adv
i + α · sign(∇ILalli ), ) ,
where z is the ground-truth depth map. When n = 1, we
reformulate the final line of Eq. 7 as in Eq. 5 for consistency
with earlier work. The additional term in the loss function
aims to preserve the predicting power of Fz while compro-
mising that of Fd as much as possible. We again use the
same values as before for  and α, and λ = 0.01 is the same
balancing factor as in Eq. 3.
Targeted Exposed FSGT (FSGM-TE(n)). Similarly,
the targeted attack iterative scheme becomes
Iadv0 = I (8)
Lalli = L(Fd(Iadvi ; Θ),Dt) + λ · L(Fz(Iadvi ; Θ), z) ,
Iadvi+1 = clip(I
adv
i − α · sign(∇ILalli ), ) .
When n = 1, we again reformulate the final line of Eq. 8
as in Eq. 5.
4.2. Evaluation Datasets
We use three different datasets to evaluate our approach.
The first two are RGB-D datasets with ground-truth depth
value obtained from sensors. Since depth sensors may not
always be available, we also evaluate our model with a third
dataset that contains RGB images with an accurate perspec-
tive map. This perspective map is a depth map computed
from the scene geometry instead of using depth sensors.
As such, it only represents the scene, not the people in it.
This will let us show that our approach not only works for
RGB-D datasets but also achieves remarkable performance
in RGB images if scene geometry is available.
ShanghaiTechRGBD [28]. This is a large-scale RGB-D
dataset with 2,193 images and 144,512 annotated heads.
The valid depth ranges from 0 to 20 meters due to the limi-
tation in depth sensors. The lighting condition ranges from
very bright to very dark in different scenarios. We use the
same setting as in [28], with 1,193 images as training set
and the remaining ones as test set, and normalize the depth
values from [0,20] to [0,1] for both training and evaluation.
MICC [2]. It is acquired by a fixed indoor surveillance
camera. This dataset is divided into three video sequences,
named FLOW, QUEUE and GROUPS. The crowd motion
varies from sequence to sequence. In the FLOW sequence,
people walk from point to point. In the QUEUE sequence,
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Figure 3: Crowd density estimation with original and perturbed images. (a) Original image. (b) Image under FSGM-U(19) attack.
(c) Ground-truth density map with 51 people. (d) Density map inferred from the original image, leading to an estimate of 51.8 people. (e)
Density map inferred from the perturbed image (b), yielding an estimated number of people of 18.1. Note the mismatch in density map
and people counts between the original image and the perturbed one.
people walk in a line. In the GROUPS sequence, people
move inside a controlled area. There are 1,260 frames in the
FLOW sequence with 3,542 heads. The QUEUE sequence
contains 5,031 heads in 918 frames, and the GROUPS se-
quence encompasses 1,180 frames with 9,057 heads. We
follow the same setting as in [28], taking 20% of the images
of each scene as training set and using the remaining ones
as test set.
Venice [37]. The above two RGB-D datasets contain
depth information acquired by sensors. Such information
is hard to obtain in outdoor environments, particularly if the
scene is far from the camera. Therefore, we also evaluate
our approach on the Venice dataset. This dataset contains
RGB images and an accurate perspective map of each scene.
It was obtained using the grid-like ground pattern, as shown
in Fig. 4, and thus does not depend on any depth sensor. The
dataset contains 4 different sequences for a total of 167 an-
notated frames with fixed 1,280 × 720 resolution. Our ex-
perimental setting follows that of [37, 36], with 80 images
from a single long sequence as training data, and the images
from the remaining 3 sequences for testing purposes.
Figure 4: Example image from Venice. In Venice dataset, each
image is provided with a perspective map, which is computed from
the grid-like ground pattern.
4.3. Metrics and Baselines
In all our experiments, we partition the images into four
parts and tamper with one while leaving the other three un-
touched. We then measure two things:
• How well can we detect the pixels that have been tam-
pered with? We measure this in terms of the mean In-
tersection over Union
mIoU =
1
N
N∑
i=1
|vi ∩ vˆi|
|vi ∪ vˆi| (9)
where N is the number of images, vˆi is 1 for the pixels
in image Ii predicted to have been tampered with ac-
cording to Eq. 2 and vi is the ground-truth perturbation
mask.
• How well do modifications of the depth map corre-
late with modifications of the predicted density? As
in many previous works [71, 69, 44, 49, 63, 54, 37, 36]
we quantify these modifications in terms of the mean
absolute error for densities and depths along with the
root mean squared error for density. They are defined
as
DMAE =
1
N
N∑
i=1
|di − dˆi|; ,
ZMAE =
1
N
N∑
i=1
∑Mi
j=1 |zji − ˆzji |
Mi
, (10)
RMSE =
√√√√ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(di − dˆi)2 ,
whereN is the number of test images, di and z
j
i denote
the true number of people in the ith image and depth
value at pixel j of the ith image, and dˆi and
ˆ
zji are
the estimated values. Mi is the number of tampered
pixels in the ith image. In practice dˆi is obtained by
integrating the predicted people densities.
In the absence of prior art on defenses against attacks of
density estimation algorithms, we use the following base-
lines for comparison purposes.
• RANDHALF and RANDQUARTER. We randomly
label either half or a quarter of the pixels as being un-
der attack, given that we know a priori that exactly a
ShanghaiTechRGBD MICC Venice
Attack DMAE RMSE ZMAE DMAE RMSE ZMAE DMAE RMSE ZMAE
Original image 4.32 7.16 0.04 0.52 0.67 1.36 21.92 24.74 1.13
FSGM-U(1) 61.56 71.58 0.12 2.45 3.01 7.46 78.75 88.65 2.16
FSGM-T(1) 60.31 70.08 0.12 1.66 1.87 7.77 202.54 204.65 2.62
FSGM-U(19) 64.55 75.11 0.14 3.13 3.75 7.68 48.56 57.83 1.76
FSGM-T(19) 62.86 73.09 0.13 1.90 2.15 7.77 112.17 115.24 1.93
FSGM-UE(1) 58.14 68.34 0.11 2.72 3.33 6.66 58.40 66.94 2.03
FSGM-TE(1) 53.64 63.43 0.11 2.47 3.02 6.65 171.76 174.31 2.53
FSGM-UE(19) 63.81 74.30 0.10 2.44 2.97 5.26 42.74 51.20 1.80
FSGM-TE(19) 52.89 62.43 0.10 2.30 2.81 5.26 95.71 99.13 1.92
Table 2: Error Summary of Crowd Density and Depth Estima-
tion
quarter are. We introduced RANDHALF to show that
using a random rate other than the true one does not
help.
• HETERO. Since adversarial attacks is caused by mod-
ifying the input image, it can be seen as heteroscedastic
aleatoric uncertainty [22], which assumes that obser-
vation noise vary with input. We threshold the uncer-
tainty values to classify each pixel as perturbed or not
and report the results obtained with the best threshold.
• ENSEMBLES. We use the approach of [24] that relies
on a scalable method for estimating predictive uncer-
tainty estimates from deep nets using a proper scoring
rule as the training criteria. The optional adversarial
training process is not used as we do not know the po-
tential attackers in advance. As before, we threshold
the uncertainty values to obtain a pixel-wise classifica-
tion map and report the best results.
• BAYESIAN. We further compare our model with
Bayesian uncertainty [13], which uses dropout as
Bayesian approximation of model uncertainty. Again,
we threshold the uncertainty value and report the re-
sults for the best threshold.
The baseline models are trained with the same crowd
density regression networks as our approach.
4.4. Comparative Performance
Using the CAN [37] architecture. CAN is an encoder-
decoder crowd density estimation architecture, that delivers
excellent performance. We use it to implement Fd and du-
plicate its decoder to implement Fz . Recall from Section 3
that we use the hyper-parameter λ of Eq. 3 to balance the
people density estimation loss and the depth estimation loss
while training Fd and Fz . In Table 3, we report the per-
formance of the two regressors as a function of the value
of λ. λ = 0.01 yields the best performance overall and we
use regressors trained using this value in all our other ex-
periments. Interestingly, training Fd and Fz jointly yields
a better density regressor than training Fd alone, which is
what we do when we set λ to zero.
We report the counting and depth errors with/without at-
tack in Table 2 for the 3 datasets. All the attacks cause large
ShanghaiTechRGBD MICC Venice
λ DMAE RMSE ZMAE DMAE RMSE ZMAE DMAE RMSE ZMAE
0.0 4.82 7.23 NA 0.91 0.98 NA 23.51 38.92 NA
0.001 4.76 7.19 0.21 0.86 0.93 2.26 21.81 24.91 2.59
0.01 4.32 7.16 0.04 0.52 0.67 1.36 21.92 24.74 1.13
0.1 4.61 7.41 0.03 0.61 0.73 1.43 23.12 26.52 1.23
1.0 4.80 7.26 0.04 0.89 0.93 1.47 23.27 32.16 1.32
10.0 4.92 8.01 1.16 0.98 1.04 1.72 25.43 39.65 1.86
Table 3: Error Summary of Crowd Density and Depth Estima-
tion for different λ values
Attack RANDHALF RANDQUARTER HETERO [22] ENSEMBLES [24] BAYESIAN [13] OURS
FSGM-U(1) 0.20 0.14 0.23 0.35 0.23 0.54
FSGM-T(1) 0.20 0.14 0.23 0.32 0.24 0.54
FSGM-U(19) 0.20 0.14 0.28 0.36 0.23 0.58
FSGM-T(19) 0.20 0.14 0.28 0.33 0.24 0.57
FSGM-UE(1) 0.20 0.14 0.24 0.28 0.23 0.52
FSGM-TE(1) 0.20 0.14 0.21 0.30 0.23 0.51
FSGM-UE(19) 0.20 0.14 0.20 0.33 0.23 0.45
FSGM-TE(19) 0.20 0.14 0.25 0.30 0.24 0.47
Table 4: mIoU of Pixel-Wise Adversarial Detection on Shang-
haiTechRGBD
Attack RANDHALF RANDQUARTER HETERO [22] ENSEMBLES [24] BAYESIAN [13] OURS
FSGM-U(1) 0.20 0.14 0.30 0.35 0.28 0.46
FSGM-T(1) 0.20 0.14 0.33 0.32 0.26 0.49
FSGM-U(19) 0.20 0.14 0.30 0.30 0.27 0.49
FSGM-T(19) 0.20 0.14 0.32 0.37 0.23 0.49
FSGM-UE(1) 0.20 0.14 0.30 0.35 0.26 0.41
FSGM-TE(1) 0.20 0.14 0.28 0.31 0.28 0.41
FSGM-UE(19) 0.20 0.14 0.31 0.33 0.28 0.40
FSGM-TE(19) 0.20 0.14 0.30 0.34 0.27 0.40
Table 5: mIoU of Pixel-Wise Adversarial Detection on MICC
Attack RANDHALF RANDQUARTER HETERO [22] ENSEMBLES [24] BAYESIAN [13] OURS
FSGM-U(1) 0.20 0.14 0.24 0.19 0.23 0.42
FSGM-T(1) 0.20 0.14 0.26 0.20 0.22 0.49
FSGM-U(19) 0.20 0.14 0.25 0.16 0.22 0.36
FSGM-T(19) 0.20 0.14 0.26 0.18 0.23 0.38
FSGM-UE(1) 0.20 0.14 0.22 0.20 0.23 0.40
FSGM-TE(1) 0.20 0.14 0.23 0.20 0.25 0.48
FSGM-UE(19) 0.20 0.14 0.26 0.21 0.24 0.38
FSGM-TE(19) 0.20 0.14 0.22 0.19 0.23 0.41
Table 6: mIoU of Pixel-Wise Adversarial Detection on Venice
increase in crowd counting errors, which always comes with
a substantial increase in depth estimation error. The ex-
posed methods reduce slightly this increase but at the cost
of also making the attack less effective.
In Tables 4, 5, and 6, we report the pixel-wise adversar-
ial detection accuracy for the ShanghaiTechRGBD, MICC
andVenice datasets. Our approach outperforms all the base-
line models by a large margin for all the attacks. In Fig. 5,
we show a qualitative result.
Using the CSRNet [27] and MCNN [71] architectures.
To show that the above results are not tied to CAN archi-
tecture, we re-ran our experiments using CSRNet [27] and
MCNN [71]. As can be seen in Fig. 6, we get similar mIoU
scores for all three, with a slight advantage for the more
recent CAN.
4.5. Tampering with the Ground-Truth Depth Map
The results of Section 4.4 were obtained under the as-
sumption that we have access to a ground-truth depth map
that is safe from attack. In some scenarios, this might not be
the case and the attacker might be able to tamper with the
Original image Image under FSGM-U(1) attack Region of interest Ground truth OURS
Figure 5: Pixel-wise adversarial detection on ShanghaiTechRGBD. Original image, image under attack, ROI(red), ground-truth attacked
region within the ROI(red), and attacked region estimated by our method. Note how similar the attacked region mask produced by OURS
is to the ground truth.
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Figure 6: Detection accuracy with different backbones. We report the mIoU of different backbones on different datasets.
depth map. Fortunately, even if this were the case, the at-
tack would still be detectable as follows. Given N training
depth maps {z1, z2, ..., zN} recorded by a fixed depth sen-
sor, we can record the min and max depth values for each
pixel j as
zjmin = min(z
j
1, z
j
2, ..., z
j
N ). (11)
zjmax = max(z
j
1, z
j
2, ..., z
j
N ).
Given M ground-truth depth maps {z˙1, z˙2, ..., z˙M} that are
exposed and can be tampered with, the tampered depth
value at pixel j of the ground-truth depth map z˙k can be
written as
tjk = z˙
j
k + βµ
j
z , (12)
where µjz is the mean depth value in the ground-truth depth
maps in the test dataset, and β is a scalar that represents
the perturbation strength of a potential attack. We take the
perturbation βµjz to be a function of β because the ground-
truth depth map is not an input to our network. If the at-
tacker were able to choose an appropriate β for each pixel
of the ground-truth depth map, the tampering indicator of
Eq. 2 could be compromised. Fortunately, such an attack
is very likely to be detected using the following simple but
effective approach. If tjk < z
j
min or t
j
k > z
j
max, we la-
bel the ground-truth pixel as potentially tampered with. As
shown in Fig. 8, the pixel-wise detection accuracy is over
90% even for extremely small perturbations with β = 0.01
and quickly increases from there. This makes the attacker’s
task difficult indeed.
4.6. Sensitivity Analysis
We now quantify the influence of the two main hyper-
parameters introduced in Section 4.1 that control the inten-
sity of the attacks.
Perturbation value. We change the value of  in Eq. 4
and Eq. 5 from 1.0 to 35.0 for all attacks and plot the re-
sulting mIoU in Fig. 7. Our model can detect very weak
attacks with  down to 1.0 and its performance quickly in-
creases for larger values. In the supplementary material, we
will exhibit the monotonous relationship between  and the
people density estimation error. When  = 1.0, there is al-
ready a small perturbation of the density estimates—around
6 in DMAE for ShanghaiTechRGBD—that then become
much larger as  increases. The number of iterations n is set
to min(+ 4, 1.25) as recommended in earlier work [23].
Threshold value. In Tables 8, 9 and 10, we report mIoU
values on each dataset as a function of the threshold we use
to classify a pixel as tampered with or not, depending on the
ratio of Eq. 2. 5% gives the best answer across all attacks.
Strength of White Attacks. To check the robustness of
our model against white-box attacks, we evaluate differ-
ent λ values in the loss term of Eq. 7, whose role is to
keep the depth estimate as steady as possible in Shang-
haiTechRGBD. We tested our approach for values of λ
ranging from 0.01 to 100.0 and report the detection accu-
racy results along with the crowd counting error and depth
error in Table 7. For larger values λ, both the crowd density
error and the detection rate drop. In other words, increas-
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Figure 7: Detection accuracy with different perturbation strengths. We report the mIoU for different  values on different datasets.
Dataset FSGM-UE(1) FSGM-TE(1) FSGM-UE(19) FSGM-TE(19)
λ mIoU DMAE RMSE ZMAE mIoU DMAE RMSE ZMAE mIoU DMAE RMSE ZMAE mIoU DMAE RMSE ZMAE
0.01 0.52 58.14 68.34 0.11 0.51 53.64 63.43 0.11 0.45 63.81 74.30 0.10 0.47 52.89 62.43 0.10
1.0 0.41 36.62 42.51 0.09 0.38 35.73 41.44 0.09 0.36 36.72 40.14 0.08 0.36 33.73 38.12 0.08
100.0 0.36 18.73 22.31 0.08 0.33 15.59 23.32 0.07 0.30 14.83 19.11 0.06 0.31 17.62 20.68 0.07
Table 7: Detection accuracy and error rates for different λ values on ShanghaiTechRGBD
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Figure 8: Detection accuracy on MICC. We report the detection
accuracy for depth values tampered with different strengths.
1% 3% 5% 10%
FSGM-U(1) 0.42 0.48 0.54 0.51
FSGM-T(1) 0.45 0.49 0.54 0.49
FSGM-U(19) 0.41 0.47 0.58 0.50
FSGM-T(19) 0.44 0.52 0.57 0.50
FSGM-UE(1) 0.39 0.43 0.52 0.48
FSGM-TE(1) 0.42 0.44 0.51 0.46
FSGM-UE(19) 0.36 0.42 0.45 0.40
FSGM-TE(19) 0.40 0.42 0.47 0.44
Table 8: Pixel-Wise Adversarial Detection on Shang-
haiTechRGBD for different indicator values
ing λ makes the attack harder to detect but also weaker. We
show the same trend in the other datasets in the supplemen-
tary material.
5. Conclusion and Future Perspectives
In this paper, we have shown that estimating density and
depth jointly in a two-stream network could be leveraged
to detect adversarial attacks against crowd-counting mod-
els at the pixel level. Our experiments have demonstrated
1% 3% 5% 10%
FSGM-U(1) 0.38 0.40 0.46 0.42
FSGM-T(1) 0.40 0.42 0.49 0.46
FSGM-U(19) 0.37 0.41 0.49 0.43
FSGM-T(19) 0.37 0.40 0.49 0.42
FSGM-UE(1) 0.35 0.38 0.41 0.44
FSGM-TE(1) 0.33 0.38 0.41 0.44
FSGM-UE(19) 0.36 0.44 0.40 0.38
FSGM-TE(19) 0.39 0.46 0.40 0.38
Table 9: Pixel-Wise Adversarial Detection on MICC for differ-
ent indicator values
1% 3% 5% 10%
FSGM-U(1) 0.38 0.40 0.42 0.40
FSGM-T(1) 0.36 0.42 0.49 0.40
FSGM-U(19) 0.35 0.38 0.36 0.45
FSGM-T(19) 0.36 0.43 0.38 0.33
FSGM-UE(1) 0.38 0.46 0.40 0.38
FSGM-TE(1) 0.40 0.42 0.48 0.41
FSGM-UE(19) 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.44
FSGM-TE(19) 0.38 0.45 0.41 0.38
Table 10: Pixel-Wise Adversarial Detection on Venice for dif-
ferent indicator values
this to be the case even when the attacker knows our detec-
tion strategy, or has access to the ground-truth depth map.
In essence, our approach is an instance of a broader idea:
One can leverage multi-task learning to detect adversarial
attacks. In the future, we will therefore study the use of this
approach for other tasks, such as depth estimation, optical
flow estimation, and semantic segmentation.
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